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'''Evolutionary psychology presents models of the evolution of a modular structure to the human brain that provide explanations of why humans so naturally experience supernatural entities.''' Evolutionary approaches propose a modularity of the human mind that resulted from the ancient acquisition of a number of adaptive innate capacities that have been called innate intelligences, modules and operators, each one dedicated to different specific cognitive functions (see Gardner, 1983, 2000; d'Aquili and Newberg, 1999; Ernandes, 2013). Ernandes distinguished cognitive operators from cognitive modules, with modules involving more specific functions and anatomical brain structures, while cognitive operators involve generalized functions that involve connections with many areas of the brain. The concept of modules also reflects the isolated functioning of process, while the concept of operators reflects the notion of automatic action in response to the appropriate triggering stimuli. | |||
Evolutionary psychology presents models of the evolution of a modular structure to the human brain that provide explanations of why humans so naturally experience supernatural entities. Evolutionary approaches propose a modularity of the human mind that resulted from the ancient acquisition of a number of adaptive innate capacities that have been called innate intelligences, modules and operators, each one dedicated to different specific cognitive functions (see Gardner, 1983, 2000; d'Aquili and Newberg, 1999; Ernandes, 2013). Ernandes distinguished cognitive operators from cognitive modules, with modules involving more specific functions and anatomical brain structures, while cognitive operators involve generalized functions that involve connections with many areas of the brain. The concept of modules also reflects the isolated functioning of process, while the concept of operators reflects the notion of automatic action in response to the appropriate triggering stimuli. | |||
A range of findings support a view of the human mind as functioning through an integrated assembly of many functionally specialized modular psychological adaptations that operate mostly independently and unconsciously. Gardner's (2000) criteria for innate intelligences include: their isolated (dys)function because of brain damage; exceptional manifestation in idiot savants and child prodigies; an evolutionary plausibility; central core cognitive operations; a facility for encoding in symbol systems; a developmental history in their manifestation; and support from experimental and psychometric studies. Cognitive functions that are manifested cross-culturally point to their underlying biological dynamics involving neurognostic structures, the neurobiological structures of knowing that provide the universal aspects of the human brain/mind (Laughlin et al., 1992). | A range of findings support a view of the human mind as functioning through an integrated assembly of many functionally specialized modular psychological adaptations that operate mostly independently and unconsciously. Gardner's (2000) criteria for innate intelligences include: their isolated (dys)function because of brain damage; exceptional manifestation in idiot savants and child prodigies; an evolutionary plausibility; central core cognitive operations; a facility for encoding in symbol systems; a developmental history in their manifestation; and support from experimental and psychometric studies. Cognitive functions that are manifested cross-culturally point to their underlying biological dynamics involving neurognostic structures, the neurobiological structures of knowing that provide the universal aspects of the human brain/mind (Laughlin et al., 1992). | ||
Gardner | Gardner characterizes<ref>'''Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligence and the y of multiple intelligence and the implications for gifted education''' Cynthia Fell University of Northern Iowa. Accessed via: <nowiki>https://scholarworks.uni.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1610&context=grp</nowiki></ref> ten of these basic innate intelligences as biopsychosocial potentials inherent to our species: | ||
# an intrapersonal intelligence for looking in at one's own mind and the ability to use awareness of one's own capacities to regulate one's emotional life and relations with others; | # an intrapersonal intelligence for looking in at one's own mind and the ability to use awareness of one's own capacities to regulate one's emotional life and relations with others; | ||
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Ernandes proposes that while the frontal cortex becomes involved in the control of many innate operators, they mostly have their basis in the R-complex and its linkages with the limbic system since they are widely distributed in reptiles and/or mammals. This role of these ancient brain system attest to these modules as involving ancient adaptations. Psychedelic experiences should not be expected to manifest operators that depend on the higher level cognitive integration provided by the PFC or the self or autobiographical qualities maintained by the DMN. Psychedelics do not elicit mathematical intelligence, and certain language functions can be difficult if not impossible; a semantic function might notably remain while speech is generally compromised. In contrast Gardener's operators for intrapersonal, interpersonal, bodily-kinesthetic (mimetic), musical, and naturalist (animal) intelligence are prominently manifested in psychedelic experiences, especially in the form of supernatural entities. | Ernandes proposes that while the frontal cortex becomes involved in the control of many innate operators, they mostly have their basis in the R-complex and its linkages with the limbic system since they are widely distributed in reptiles and/or mammals. This role of these ancient brain system attest to these modules as involving ancient adaptations. Psychedelic experiences should not be expected to manifest operators that depend on the higher level cognitive integration provided by the PFC or the self or autobiographical qualities maintained by the DMN. Psychedelics do not elicit mathematical intelligence, and certain language functions can be difficult if not impossible; a semantic function might notably remain while speech is generally compromised. In contrast Gardener's operators for intrapersonal, interpersonal, bodily-kinesthetic (mimetic), musical, and naturalist (animal) intelligence are prominently manifested in psychedelic experiences, especially in the form of supernatural entities. | ||
'''References''' |